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Abstract This paper explores the discourse status of English causal clauses 
introduced by since. Tests for non-at-issueness demonstrate that neither the 
relation (between the subordinate and the superordinate clause) expressed by 
since nor the content of the subordinate clause is at-issue. Other diagnostics 
further show that these two not-at-issue contents triggered by since belong to two 
different classes of projective content. This can be accounted for by attributing 
two different sources to their non-at-issueness: the relation expressed by since is 
not-at-issue for structural reasons, i.e. because since-clauses modify high 
evidential or speech act phrases, which are not-at-issue; the content of the 
subordinate clause is not-at-issue because since lexically selects factive clauses. 
More generally, this study (and future comparative studies on other 
subordinators) promises to shed further light on the constraints on different 
contents projected by the same trigger and the role played by structure in non-at-
issueness. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the discourse status of English causal clauses introduced by 
since (since-clauses, henceforth) exemplified below: 
 
(1) Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack. 
 
(2) Let’s go for a drink, since you insist. 
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discussion and comments on work related to the topic of this paper. This work is supported in part 
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Unlike causal clauses introduced by because such as (3) (because-clauses, 
henceforth), since-clauses do not express the cause of the event described in the 
matrix clause,1 but they rather provide some evidence for the truth of the matrix 
proposition, as in (1), or some reason for the matrix speech act, as in (2) (see 
Charnavel 2017a and references therein).2 
 
(3) Liz left because she was tired. 
 
The goal of this paper is to show that unlike because-clauses, since-clauses 
are never understood as the main point of the utterance, that is, they are not at-
issue (see Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts 2010, i.a.). More precisely, 
since-clauses are associated with two implications, namely the content of the 
subordinate clause B (the B-implication, henceforth) and the relation expressed by 
since between that B clause and the matrix clause A (the since-implication, 
henceforth), and neither implication is at-issue. But their non-at-issueness comes 
from two different sources, I will argue, as the B-implication and the since-
implication correspond to two different types of projective content. More 
generally, the case study of since-clauses should thus shed light on the constraints 
on and properties of different projective contents triggered by the same element. 
First (in Section 2), I will establish the empirical generalizations by applying 
the diagnostics for (non)-at-issueness and projection to both implications. Then 
(in Section 3), I will propose an account for the non-at-issueness of each 
implication: the since-implication is not at-issue because since-clauses modify 
not-at-issue content, namely evidential and speech act phrases; and the B-
implication is not at-issue because the subordinator since selects a factive 
complement. One source of non-at-issueness is therefore structural, and the other 
one is lexical. 
 
2. Empirical generalizations: double non-at-issueness of since-clauses 
 
2.1 Diagnosing the not-at-issue contents associated with since-clauses 
 
In (1) above repeated in (4) below, neither the fact that Liz’s coat is not on the 
rack nor the evidential relation between that fact and the conclusion that she has 
left are understood as the main point of the utterance, but they are secondary and 
backgrounded: the main point of the utterance is to convey that Liz has left. The 																																																								
1 Some because-clauses (with a different prosody) can also modify propositions or speech acts, 
just like since-clauses (cf. Rutherford 1970, Sæbø 1991, i.a.). In this paper, I only mention 
because-clauses that modify an event as a point of comparison with since-clauses. 
2 The same holds in other languages, cf. French parce que vs. puisque (see Groupe λ-1 1975, 
Charnavel 2017b, i.a.), German weil vs. denn (see Scheffler 2008, Antomo 2009, i.a.). 
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same holds in (2) repeated as (5): neither implication associated with the since-
clause is at-issue, only the content of the matrix clause is. 
 
(4) Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack. 
-A-implication: Liz has left               [at-issue] 
-B-implication: Liz’s coat is not on the rack       [not at-issue] 
-since-implication: the absence of Liz’s coat on the rack indicates that she 
left            [not at-issue] 
 
(5) Let’s go for a drink, since you insist. 
-A-implication: the speaker exhorts the addressee to go for a drink [at-issue] 
-B-implication: the addressee insists on going for a drink    [not-at-issue] 
-since-implication: the addressee’s insistence is a reason for exhorting her 
to go for a drink         [not-at-issue] 
 
This can be demonstrated by several tests (see Tonhauser 2012, i.a.). The first 
diagnostic is based on the fact that a proposition is at-issue if it addresses the 
Question Under Discussion (QUD, see Roberts 1996). Conversely, not-at-issue 
content cannot serve as the intended answer to the QUD, or more precisely, it may 
not be intended as the sole content of an utterance to address the QUD (see 
Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser 2012, i.a.). The diagnostic thus consists in testing 
whether the implications associated with since-clauses can serve as an answer to a 
question when in principle, their content entails an answer to that question. The 
infelicitous dialogs in (6) and (7) show that they cannot. 
 
(6) a.  Where is Liz’s coat? 
b. # Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack. 
 
(7) a.  Why has Liz left? / How do you know that Liz has left? 
b. # Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack.  
 
In (6), the B-implication (the content of the subordinate clause) in (b) is intended 
to be the answer to the question in (a), as its content is directly relevant to that 
question. But sentence (b) is an infelicitous answer to (a), which shows that the B-
implication is not at-issue. This contrasts with the A-implication (the content of 
the matrix clause), which is at-issue as it can address the QUD as in (8). 
 
(8) a. Where is Liz? 
b. Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack. 
 
Similarly, (7) shows that the since-implication (the relation between the matrix 
clause and the subordinate clause) cannot serve as an answer to any type of 
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question and is therefore not at-issue either. Since-clauses differ in that respect 
from because-clauses, which can answer why-questions as exemplified in (9). 
 
(9) a. Why has Liz left? 
b. Liz has left because she was tired.  
 
The second diagnostic relies on the fact that only at-issue content can be 
challenged and confirms that neither the B-implication nor the since-implication 
is at-issue. Specifically, the at-issue content of a speaker’s utterance can be 
assented or dissented with, i.e. it can be directly accepted or rejected by an 
addressee (see Tonhauser 2012, i.a.). Not-at-issue content, however, can only 
indirectly be challenged with utterances such as “Hey, wait a minute!” (see 
Shanon 1976, von Fintel 2004). One way to diagnose (non)-at-issueness is thus to 
explore the acceptability of utterances where an assent/dissent is followed by an 
adversative utterance that conveys a hypothesized at-issue or not-at-issue content 
(Tonhauser’s 2012 diagnostic #1c). The assumption behind the diagnostic is that 
such utterances are contradictory, therefore unacceptable, when the continuations 
convey at-issue content, but acceptable when they convey not-at-issue content. 
The diagnostic is applied to since-clauses in (10)-(11). 
 
(10) a. Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack. 
b. Yes, true, but her coat is in fact on the rack.             [B-implication] 
 
(11) a. Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack. 
b. Yes, true, but in fact, the absence of her coat on the rack does not prove 
anything: she did not take it.          [since-implication] 
 
Both responses in (10) and (11) consist of assents followed by adversative 
utterances that convey the content of the B-implication and that of the since-
implication, respectively. Both (10) and (11) are acceptable, which supports the 
hypothesis that the B-implication and the since-implication are not at-issue. Just 
as above, this contrasts with the status of the A-implication on the one hand, and 
that of the because-implication on the other hand, as shown in (12)-(13): both 
responses are contradictory, which confirms that the A-implication and the 
because-implication are at-issue. 
 
(12) a.  Liz has left, since her coat is not on the rack. 
b. # Yes, true, but in fact, she has not left.                         [A-implication] 
 
(13) a. Liz has left, because she was tired. 
b. # Yes, true, but in fact, her tiredness did not cause her to leave. 
 [because-implication] 
 
Thus, the two diagnostics show that the two implications associated with 
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since-clauses are not at-issue. So far, they have been applied to evidential since-
clauses, that is, since-clauses like (1) that provide evidence for the truth of the 
matrix proposition. The same holds for speech act since-clauses, that is, since-
clauses like (2) that provide reasons for the matrix speech act. As assertions are 
easier to challenge and to serve as answers to questions than other speech acts, it 
is more appropriate to apply the diagnostics to (14) below, where the since-clause 
modifies an assertion, than with (2), where the since-clause modifies an 
exhortation. 
 
(14) Liz has left, since you must know everything. 
 
Just as in the case of the evidential since-clause in (6)-(7) and (10)-(11), neither 
the B-implication nor the since-implication associated with this speech act since-
clause can address the QUD, as shown in (15)-(16), or can be directly challenged, 
as exemplified in (17)-(18). 
 
(15) a.  What do (you think) I want to know? 
b. # Liz has left, since you must know everything.             [B-implication] 
 
(16) a.  Why has Liz left? / Why should you tell me where Liz is? 
b. # Liz has left, since you must know everything.      [since-implication] 
 
(17) a. Liz has left, since you must know everything. 
b. Yes, true, but I am not asking to know everything.             [B-implication] 
 
(18) a. Liz has left, since you must know everything. 
b. Yes, true, but it’s not because I want to know everything that you need to 
tell me.                  [since-implication] 
 
A further observation that corroborates this generalization is that since-clauses 
cannot be focused (cf. Sæbø 1991, i.a.). For instance, neither type of since-clause 
can be clefted, as shown in (19), while because-clauses can, as illustrated in (20). 
 
(19) a. *It is since her coat is not on the rack that Liz has left. 
b. *It is since you must know everything that Liz has left. 
 
(20) It is because she was tired that Liz has left. 
 
Similarly, (21) and (22) show that unlike because-clauses, since-clauses cannot be 
associated with a focus particle like only. 
 
(21) a. # Liz has only left since her coat is not on the rack. 
[Intended: the only piece of evidence indicating that Liz has left is the 
absence of her coat on the rack] 
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b. # Liz has only left since you must know everything. 
[Intended: the only reason why I am asserting that Liz has left is your 
willingness to know everything] 
 
(22) Liz has only left because she was tired.  
[i.e. the only reason why Liz has left is her tiredness] 
 
Given that not-at-issue content cannot usually be focused,3 this supports the 
hypothesis that since-clauses are not at-issue. 
 
2.2 Two types of projective contents 
 
Given that the two implications associated with since-clauses are not-at-issue, 
they are predicted to project (see Simons et al. 2010). An implication is said to 
project if and only if it survives as an utterance implication (i.e. is understood as a 
commitment of the speaker) when the expression that triggers the implication 
occurs under the syntactic scope of an entailment-cancelling operator. Under the 
classical theory, presuppositions thus survive under negations, questions, modals 
or conditionals. But it has been observed (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990, 
i.a.)	that projection potential is not just a property of standard presuppositions, but 
also of other types of implications such as conventional implicatures (Potts 2005). 
This led Simons et al. (2010) to propose that projection is intimately tied to 
discourse structure: all and only not-at-issue contents project. 
The prediction seems4 to be borne out for since-clauses. As shown in (23), 
both the B-implication (Liz’s coat is not on the rack) and the since-implication 
(the absence of Liz’s coat on the rack indicates that she left) are still understood 
as commitments of the speaker in the presence of a negation, question, modal or 
conditional. This contrasts with because-implications that are affected by these 
operators as exemplified in (24). 
 
(23) a. # It is not the case that Liz left since her coat is not on the rack. [negation] 
b.  Did Liz leave, since her coat is not on the rack?          [question] 
c.  It is possible that Liz left since her coat is not on the rack.           [modal] 
d.  If Liz left since her coat is not on the rack, I’ll go.          [conditional] 
 																																																								
3 The relation between non-at-issueness and focusability is more complex (see Abrusán 2016, 
Simons et al. 2016, Sæbø 2016, i.a.). In particular, the entire not-at-issue content cannot be 
focused, but part of it can contain contrastive focus as illustrated below. 
(i) a. “I cannot see Liz’s purse, has she left?” 
     b. “No, she hasn’t left, since her COAT is still on the rack.” 
4 This conclusion is complicated by the fact that it is not clear that since-clauses can be under the 
syntactic scope of all these operators. We will briefly come back to this issue in Section 3.1. 
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(24) a. It is not the case that Liz left because she was tired.         [negation] 
b. Did Liz leave because she was tired?                  [question] 
c. It is possible that Liz left because she was tired.                   [modal] 
d. If Liz left because she was tired, I’ll go.         [conditional] 
 
If all projective meanings are characterized by non-at-issueness, it does not 
mean that they do not differ in other respects: Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & 
Simons (2013) establish distinctions among projective contents on the basis of a 
series of diagnostics. These tests applied to since-clauses reveal that the B-
implication and the since-implication do not belong to the same class of projective 
content. The first test (Strong Contextual Felicity) is meant to diagnose the 
presence of a constraint on context: specifically, the diagnostic consists of testing 
whether the implication under investigation must be entailed by the context to be 
felicitous. When we apply this diagnostic to the two implications associated with 
since-clauses as in (25)-(26), we observe that only the since-implication is subject 
to this constraint. 
 
(25) [Context: Paul has invited guests for New Year’s Eve. As Luke is looking 
for Liz, Paul tells him:] 
Liz left, since her coat is not on the rack.              [B-implication] 
 
(26) [Context: When Paul was away, Claire and Paul’s neighbors told Claire that 
they turn their radio on every time they leave to turn away potential thieves. 
Paul now hears the neighbors’ loud radio and asks Claire to talk to them and 
ask them to lower the volume. She replies:] 
#The neighbors have left, since their radio is on.           [since-implication] 
 
In (25), the context does not imply the B-implication, but only the since-
implication: the addressee Luke does not know that Liz’s coat is not on the rack, 
but he knows (due to common knowledge) that the absence of someone’s coat on 
the rack indicates that that person left. In that context, sentence (25) is perfectly 
felicitous, which means that the B-implication is not subject to Strong Contextual 
Felicity: it can easily be accommodated. Conversely, the context of (26) only 
implies the B-implication, but not the since-implication. To guarantee this, the 
example involves an evidential relation that is not stereotypical: it is usually not 
the case that the sound of a radio in a house indicates that its residents left (rather 
the opposite). Thus, the addressee Paul knows that the neighbors’ radio is on, but 
he does not know that this indicates that they left. In that context, Claire’s answer 
is not felicitous, which shows that unlike the B-implication, the since-implication 
is subject to the Strong Contextual Felicity constraint. 
The second diagnostic (Obligatory Local Effect) tests the behavior of 
projective contents with respect to embedding operators such as propositional 
attitude verbs. Specifically, an implication is subject to the Obligatory Locality 
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Effect if the belief that the implication holds must be attributed to the attitude 
holder. To apply this diagnostic to since-clauses, we must first check whether they 
can be embedded in attitude contexts. Sentences (27)-(28), which transpose (1) 
and (14) into attitude contexts, show that evidential since-clauses can, but not 
speech act since-clauses. 
 
(27)  Paul thinks that since her coat is not on the rack, Liz left.  
       
(28) # Paul asserts that since his interlocutor must know everything, Liz left.    
 
In both (27) and (28), fronting of the since-clause within the embedded clause 
guarantees that it is embedded (it does not modify the matrix clause, but the 
embedded clause). In that configuration, the since-clause in (27) provides 
evidence for the truth of the embedded proposition, similarly to (1) with respect to 
the matrix proposition. However, the since-clause in (28) cannot be understood as 
modifying the reported speech act (Paul’s assertion), which is consistent with the 
observation that speech acts are usually not embeddable (cf. Krifka 2014). Thus, 
only evidential since-clauses are embeddable in attitude contexts.5 
The Obligatory Local Effect diagnostic can therefore be applied to evidential 
since-clauses only. If we do so as in (29)-(30), we observe that both the B-
implication and the since-implication are subject to this effect. 
 
(29) # Paul thinks that since her coat is not on the rack, Liz left, and he also 
thinks that Liz’s coat is still on the rack.              [B-implication] 
       
(30) # Paul does not know that the neighbors turn their radio on when they leave, 
and he thinks that since their radio is on, they must have left. 
[since-implication] 
 
In (29), the since-clause is embedded under think, and the negation of the content 
of the B-implication is embedded under the same predicate. The conjunction is 
contradictory, which shows that when a since-clause is embedded in an attitude 
context, the belief that the B-implication holds must be attributed to the attitude 
holder (Paul in (29)). In (30), the attitude holder Paul is explicitly ignorant about 
the content of the since-implication;6 in that case, the since-clause cannot be 																																																								
5 More precisely, they can only be embedded under predicates of acceptance: just like epistemic 
modals (Anand & Hacquart 2013), they cannot be embedded under desideratives or directives. 
(ii) #Paul {wants/demands} that since her coat is not on the rack, Liz leave. 
The similar behavior of since-clauses and epistemic modals is not surprising given that both types 
of elements are related to evidentiality (cf. von Fintel & Gillies 2010, i.a., for discussion about the 
relation between epistemic modals and evidentiality). 
6 The test is applied slightly differently in (30) as compared to (29) (does not know that vs. does 
not think that) because unlike the B-implication, the since-implication is subject to the Strong 
Contextual Felicity constraint (cf. Tonhauser et al. 2013). 
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embedded in an attitude context with Paul as the center. Just like in the case of the 
B-implication, the belief that the since-implication holds must thus be attributed 
to the attitude holder when the since-clause is embedded in an attitude context. 
In sum, the since-implication is subject to both the Strong Contextual Felicity 
constraint and the Obligatory Local Effect, while the B-implication is only subject 
to the latter. The two implications associated with since-clauses thus belong to 
different classes of projective content (class A and class C) as summarized in 
Table 1 below. 
 
3. Analysis: two different sources of non-at-issueness 
 
The previous diagnostics have demonstrated that since-clauses are associated with 
two different types of not-at-issue content. The goal of this section is to show that 
the non-at-issueness of each implication comes from different sources. 
 
3.1  The since-implication: a structural source of non-at-issueness 
 
The non-at-issueness of the since-implication results, I hypothesize, from the high 
structural position of since-clauses: since-clauses modify Evidential or Speech 
Act phrases, which are not at-issue, and modifiers of not-at-issue content, I 
assume, cannot be at-issue themselves. 
The hypothesis that since-clauses modify either Evidential phrases or Speech 
Act phrases is supported both by their meaning and by their height. As we have 
seen above, since-clauses like (1) provide some evidence for the truth of the 
matrix proposition. They are thus similar to evidential markers (see Faller 2002 
and references therein): while evidential markers indicate the type of evidence 
(e.g. direct vs. hearsay vs. conjectural in Faller 2002), since-clauses specify the 
content of indirect inferential evidence. Since-clauses can therefore modify 
indirect evidential markers like apparently in (31). 
 
(31) Liz has apparently left, since her coat is not on the rack.  
 
These semantic considerations support the idea that this type of since-clauses 
modifies Evidential phrases, which host evidential elements (Cinque 1999, Speas 
& Tenny 2003, Speas 2004, i.a.). Similarly, we have seen that since-clauses like 
(2) or (14) provide a reason for the speech act expressed in the matrix clause, 
which makes them semantically similar to speech act particles or adverbs like 
frankly. This suggests that this type of since-clauses modifies the projections 
containing such elements, i.e. Speech Act phrases (Cinque 1999, Speas & Tenny 
2003, Speas 2004, Haegeman & Hill 2013, i.a.). 
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Not-at-issue content Properties of not-at-issue content 
Class Examples Projection Strong Contextual Felicity 
Obligatory 
Local Effect 
A too/existence of alternative since/since-implication ! ! ! 
B appositive ! " " 
C 
know/content of complement 
stop/prestate holds 
since/B-implication 
! " ! 
D too/salience of established alternative ! ! " 
 
Table 1 Classification of the implications associated with since-clauses among the 
different types of projective contents proposed by Tonhauser et al. (2013) 
 
 
 
Syntactic observations corroborate the hypothesis that since-clauses modify 
either Evidential Phrases (EvidP) or Speech Act Phrases (SAP). EvidP and SAP 
are high projections of the TP-space as represented in (32) (Cinque 1999). 
 
(32) SAP > EvalP > EvidP > EpistP > T… > Asp… > V 
 
Several scopal facts reveal that the position of since-clauses is as high as these 
projections. In particular, they scope higher than EpistP as they cannot be 
interpreted under the scope of epistemic adverbs or modals. 
 
(33) a. # Liz has probably left since her coat is not on the rack.      *probably > since 
Intended: the absence of Liz’s coat on the rack is a plausible piece of 
evidence for the fact that she left.  
b. # Liz has probably left since you must know everything.     *probably > since 
Intended: your willingness to know everything is a plausible reason for 
my asserting that Liz left. 
 
(34) a. # Liz must have left since her coat is not on the rack.             *must > since 
Intended: the absence of Liz’s coat on the rack is a plausible piece of 
evidence for the fact that she left.  
b. # Liz must have left since you must know everything.            *must > since 
Intended: your willingness to know everything is a plausible reason for 
my asserting that Liz left. 
 
This again contrasts with because-clauses, which can be outscoped by epistemic 
elements as illustrated in (35) (cf. Rutherford 1970, Sæbø 1991, i.a.). 
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(35) Liz has probably left because she was tired.                  probably > because 
i.e. Liz’s tiredness is a plausible reason for her leaving.  
 
Also, pronominal binding and NPI-licensing into a since-clause (vs. a because-
clause) by a matrix quantifier or negation is not licensed as shown in (36) vs. (37) 
and (38) vs. (39) (cf. Rutherford 1970, Sæbø 1991, Iatridou 1991, Johnston 1994, 
Charnavel 2017a, i.a.).7 
 
(36) * [No woman]i has left since heri coat is not on the rack. 
 
(37)   [No woman]i has left because shei was tired. 
 
(38) * Liz has not left since anything is missing (but since…). 
 
(39)   Liz has not left because she had anything to do (but because…). 
 
All these scopal facts support the hypothesis that since-clauses modify EvidP or 
SAP (while because-clauses modify a lower phrase like VP). Given that 
evidential and speech act markers are not at-issue (cf. Faller 2002, Murray 2010, 
i.a.) and assuming that modifiers of not-at-issue content are not at-issue either, 
this explains why the since-implication is not at-issue. 
Note that the high structural position of since-clauses may question the result 
of the projection tests presented in (23) (see fn. 4). Specifically, (34) and (38) 
show that since-clauses cannot be in the syntactic scope of negations and modals 
occurring in the superordinate clause (but in (23), negation and modal occur in an 
even higher clause). Thus, the fact that the B-implication and the since-
implication survive in the presence of such operators does not necessarily 
demonstrate that they project. In any case, this does not affect the general point 
that the two implications associated with since-clauses are two different types of 
not-at-issue content. 
 
3.2 The B-implication: a lexical source of non-at-issueness 
 
As mentioned in Table 1, the B-implication belongs to the same class of not-
at-issue content as complements of factive verbs such as know, which are also 
subject to the Local Obligatory Effect, but not to the Contextual Felicity 
constraint. I hypothesize that this is due to the fact that the subordinator since is 																																																								
7 The reverse argument has been provided (cf. Iatridou 1991) that in fact, the unavailability of 
pronominal binding or NPI-licensing in since-clauses is due to the fact that since-clauses are 
opaque to syntactic operations because they are not at-issue (‘presupposed’ in Iatridou’s 1991 
terms). But pronominal binding into a since-clause is in fact possible when the binder is in a 
higher clause as in (iii). 
(iii) [Each boy]i says that hisi mother must be here since hisi father is here. 
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also factive, i.e. selects arguments that denote facts. This implies that the B-
implication, unlike the since-implication, is lexically triggered. 
The argument motivating this hypothesis comes from the behavior of since-
clauses in attitude contexts. We have already seen that the belief that the B-
implication (as well as the since-implication) holds must be attributed to the 
attitude holder (Local Obligatory Effect). What we furthermore observe is that it 
must also be attributed to the speaker. This Global Obligatory Effect is observed 
in (40). 
 
(40) # I can see Liz’s coat on the rack, but Paul believes that since her coat is not   
   there, Liz left. 
 
In (40), the first conjunct of the sentence implies that the speaker does not believe 
that Liz’s coat is not on the rack, and the second conjunct contains a since-clause 
that implies this as a B-implication (Liz’s coat is not on the rack) and is embedded 
in an attitude context. The contradictory beliefs of the speaker and the attitude 
holder yield unfelicity: in attitude contexts, both the speaker and the attitude 
holder must be committed to the content of the since-clause (the B-implication). 
The since-implication, however, is only subject to the Local Obligatory Effect, 
not to the Global Obligatory Effect as exemplified below. 
 
(41) Paul thinks that since their radio is on, the neighbors must have left. I also 
think that they left, but I don’t think they left with the radio on on purpose. 
 
Example (41) contains a since-clause embedded in an attitude context in the first 
sentence, and the second sentence implies that like the attitude holder Paul, the 
speaker is committed to the B-implication of that clause (the neighbors’ radio is 
on) and to the A-implication (the neighbors have left), but not to the since-
implication (the fact that their radio is on indicates that the neighbors left). In that 
context, the since-clause is felicitous, which shows that the belief that the since-
implication holds must be attributed to the attitude holder, but not necessarily to 
the speaker. 
The Global Obligatory Effect is thus a specificity of the B-implication. It is 
similar to factivity effects: in a sentence like (42) involving the canonical factive 
verb know, not only Paul, but also the speaker must be committed to the fact that 
the neighbors’ radio is on. 
 
(42) Paul knows that the neighbors’ radio is on. 
 
Furthermore, this still holds in case of multiple embedding as in (43). 
 
(43) Mary thinks that Paul knows that the neighbors’ radio is on. 
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Thus, assuming that the subordinator since is factive, just like know, directly 
derives the Global Obligatory Effect.8 Specifically, I suppose that since s-selects 
for arguments (i.e. B) that denote facts. Assuming that that-clauses are either 
factive or propositional depending on their complementizer (Kratzer 2006, i.a.), 
this means that since selects factive clauses as represented in (44), while because-
clauses select non-factive clauses. Unlike the cause or explanation introduced by 
because, the evidence introduced by since-clauses is presented as a true fact. 
 
(44) a. A since B ≈ A since the fact that B 
b. [[ since B]]   = [[ since thatF B]] 9 
c. [[ thatF]] = λpλe. exemplifies (p)(e) or λp.ιe exemplifies (p)(e) (Kratzer 2006) 
 
 
4. Conclusion and open issues 
 
In sum, the subordinator since should be added to the inventory of 
presuppositional triggers. It exhibits the interesting property of triggering two 
different types of presupposition: the (evidential) relation between the subordinate 
clause and superordinate clause, which cannot be accommodated and is not 
factive (i.e. not-at-issue content of class A), and the content of the subordinate 
clause, which can be accommodated and is factive (i.e. not-at-issue content of 
class C). I have argued that these two types of projective contents have different 
sources: structural (since-clauses modify high Evidential or Speech Act phrases, 
which are not-at-issue) and lexical (since selects factive clauses). 
This raises a general question about the constraints on different projective 
contents triggered by the same element: an explanatory theory should be able to 
predict what type of relation exists between several contents projected by the 
same trigger and why. In our case, we observe that the bigger projective content 
(the since-implication) is of class A while the smaller (the B-implication) is of 
class C: accommodation and factivity only characterize the smaller projective 
content. Is this general? If so, why? 
An exploration of other clause-taking prepositions10 should allow us to make 
progress on this issue. In the domain of causality, examples like (45) or (46) 																																																								
8 Another similarity between the B-implication of since-clauses and the complement of factive 
verbs is that factivity can be suspended in both cases (cf. Karttunen 1971, Abrusán 2016, i.a., for 
the suspension of factivity with know): 
(iv) Paul thinks that Liz’s coat is not on the rack, and that since it is not there, Liz must have left. 
But in fact, I can see it – it is hidden behind my coat. 
9 The factive complementizer thatF remains silent with since. 
10 An abstract reviewer also suggests that emotive factives and change-of-state cognitive factives 
would be worth exploring in this respect as they involve both projection of the embedded clause 
content and of the attitude holder’s knowledge that that embedded clause content is true. 
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suggest (if we apply the same tests as above) that other clauses as high as since-
clauses, like clauses introduced by as or given that,11 exhibit the same 
characteristics as since-clauses with respect to non-at-issueness: neither the 
relation between the subordinate and the superordinate clause nor the content of 
the subordinate clause is at-issue, and the two implications are respectively of 
class A and C. 
 
(45) a. Liz must have left, as her coat is not on the rack. 
b. Paul thinks that as her coat is not on the rack, Liz must have left. 
 
(46) a. Liz must have left, given that her coat is not on the rack. 
b. Paul thinks that given that her coat is not on the rack, Liz must have left. 
 
This contrasts with low clauses like because-clauses that do not trigger any 
projective content.12 In particular, it seems that low clauses can only become 
factive if the noun fact is made explicit.13 
 
(47) Paul thinks that Liz left because of the fact that she was tired. 
 
This suggests that syntactic height must not only be responsible for the non-at-
issueness of the relation expressed by subordinators like since (as argued in 
Section 3.1), but also for the factivity of their complements. A lexical explanation 
(as that presented in Section 3.2) cannot explain this fact. In the future, it would 
therefore be worth further exploring the (understudied) discourse status of various 
subordinators to better understand this, if it indeed turns out to be a general fact. 
This new empirical domain promises to be very informative for the general theory 
of projective contents. 
 
 
 																																																								
11 Their height can be determined by the same syntactic tests as above, for instance by the 
unavailability of pronominal binding. 
(v)  a. #[Every woman]i left as heri coat is not on the rack. 
       b. #[Every woman]i left given that heri coat is not on the rack. 
12 As mentioned in fn. 1, because-clauses can in some cases attach higher and modify Evidential 
or Speech Act phrases, just like since-clauses (cf. Rutherford 1970, Sæbø 1991, i.a.). Crucially, 
the relation expressed by because and the content of the subordinate clause are not-at-issue in that 
case as can be tested in examples (vi). This confirms that height is crucial. 
(vi)  a. Liz must have left, because her coat is not on the rack. 
       b. Paul thinks that because her coat is not on the rack, Liz must have left. 
13 It is probably not insignificant that the noun fact cannot be made explicit with since (or with as, 
vs. given that): 
(vii) *Liz must have left, since (of) the fact that her coat is not on the rack. 
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